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Shri K. Subrahmanyam (1929- 2011), was the doyen of
Indian strategic thinking and had a clear and farsighted
vision on issues ranging from foreign policy to nuclear
deterrence. An intellectual progenitor of the Indian
nuclear weapons programme and the most influential
strategic thinker of his own and the subsequent
generation.
In a long and distinguished career that began with his
entry into the Indian Administrative Service in 1951,
Subrahmanyam straddled the fields of administration,
defence policy, academic research and journalism with
an unparalleled felicity. It was his early advocacy of India
exercising the option to produce nuclear weapons that
made governments and scholars around the world sit up
and take notice of his views.
He was the Founder-Director of the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses (IDSA), and served in that capacity
from 1968 to 1975. He returned to IDSA in 1980 and
nurtured it to become country's premier think tank with
focused research on defence and foreign policy issues.
Subrahmanyam chaired several Government committees
and commissions of enquiry, notable among them being
the enquiry commission of the 1971 Indo-Pak war and
the Kargil review committee in 1999. A major revamp of
the Indian intelligence system took place based on the
recommendations of the Kargil review committee.
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Professor Ramamurthy, Dr. Santhanam, Ladies and
Gentlemen,
To tell you the truth, I am overwhelmed at the honour
of being chosen to be the speaker at the first
K. Subrahmanyam Memorial lecture held by NIAS.
Thank you.
There are at least two reasons why this visit to NIAS and
Bangalore holds a very special significance for me, and
why I extend to NIAS and its Director and faculty my
very deep appreciation and thanks. Firstly, the recent loss
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family, to the strategic community and to the nation, but
also has been a personal loss to me. To me, Mr.
Subrahmanyam was not only a mentor and a source of
inspiration, but also a source of constant reference on the
bewildering changes that are taking place in the world.
To be invited to deliver the first K. Subrahmanyam
memorial lecture is therefore a privilege and honour and
a moving moment, for which I am most sincerely grateful.
Secondly, I have been associated with NIAS ever since
I returned to the country after the completion of my service
abroad. I was given the honour of having been nominated
an Associate Member in the late 1990s and had, at that
time been a fairly frequent visitor to these beautiful
premises.  To be here again is a special occasion and I am
delighted to be here as your guest once again. In fact, the
last time I visited NIAS was about three years ago as a
member of a Task Force led by Mr. Subrahmanyam, when
Dr. Kasturirangan was the Director.
As I have said, Mr. Subrahmanyam’s loss has dealt a
grievous blow to the still evolving strategic community,
both within and outside Government. As an optimist
about India at a time when predictions of doom and
gloom fill most of the popular discourse, his view was
often against the tide; but then he was known not to be
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influenced by the common stream, and he was, on many
occasions, prescient. In fact, a book containing articles
by him is felicitously titled “Shedding Shibboleths” a
shibboleth being, as you know, an outmoded view held
by a particular group of people.
He had a world view and of India’s place in it in these
changing times. Belying his chronological age, his mind
remained constantly innovative, adapting to these
changes with ease, without losing the consistency of his
long term vision of India’s interests. I still feel acutely the
absence of Subbu as he was affectionately called by his
friends and peers, as well as by those who were, in a sense,
and I count myself as one of them, his followers. It is not
that we agreed on all issues, but his elephantine memory
and vast experience together with his logical approach
to issues frequently silenced my arguments. His ability
to instinctively be able to distinguish between the minor,
peripheral and tactical and to be able to discern in the
welter which is our world, the significant trends and their
implications for India, made him probably the foremost
strategic thinker of our times.
I first met Mr. Subrahmanyam-he objected strongly when
someone inadvertently prefixed a ‘Dr.’ before his name-
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fairly late, after my return from Geneva in 1997, though
I had heard of his reputation and had followed his
comments on nuclear issues through the years. Over the
last several years, I found myself seeking his views on a
variety of issues, almost on a regular basis. He often gave
me books to read and pointed to other publications which
had caught his attention; discussions were long and, as
he gradually restricted his venturing out, over the
telephone. From these many discussions, I today recall a
thought he almost casually put on the table, as it were,
that India was unique in that she was perhaps the only
country that was industrializing as a full-fledged
democracy and had to deal with the world as such. Most
other countries, certainly the major powers, started their
industrial revolutions in political circumstances that were
more controlled than in a democratic polity. Without
parsing that thought too finely, in my view, its focus is
clearly on the undoubted fact that India is ‘emerging’; a
term that is more and more frequently used but remains
ill-defined, requiring some examination.
India has been here before; she ‘emerged’ from colonial
rule to independence and from what was popularly called
the license raj to a different system where controls were
eased and the private sector was given space to grow as
EMERGING INDIA: STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
9
the country tried to adapt itself to the unstoppable
demands of globalization. What seems to have caught
global attention on this occasion is India’s rapidly
growing market, and the West, characteristically specific,
has clubbed India with other emerging markets, when
the rate of growth and the size, both actual and potential,
of her market, seemed to merit putting India in a separate
category of developing countries. In actual fact, India
remains a developing country, with all the characteristics
of one, but she is a developing country in transition, as it
were, from a low income to a middle income one. In my
view, emergent India is basically an India in transition
and her strategic options are accordingly either
constrained or open possibilities for previously closed
courses of action.
Transitional periods are usually ones of some turmoil;
the more rapid the changes, the greater the uncertainties.
As China changed rapidly, she was able, to a large extent,
to contain the turmoil and the pushes of growing
expectations of her people because of her political system.
India’s change on the other hand is taking place within
the constraints of a democratic polity; the media, an active
civil society, and an equally active parliamentary
opposition, make it that much more complex to find
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certainty and clear directions in policy making and in
the taking of bold and sometimes unpopular decisions,
even while working for the broadest consensus in this
country of a million points of view. The situation,
therefore, as far as India is concerned is more fluid and
perhaps less decisive than one would have hoped. Not
that I am decrying democracy; temporary and short term
uncertainty is a small price to pay for long term stability
of both society and developmental efforts.
We are all aware of the internal challenges faced by India-
poverty, with all its human consequences, poor
governance, corruption, insurgencies and the mighty
push and impatience of a population that is young and
aspirational. It is not my intention to speak today of these
problems, but to liken this internal turmoil to the fluidity
that today characterizes international relations. It is in
this world in transition that India has to look to her
national and strategic interests.  Notwithstanding her
problems, India’s  economic growth is not only enabling
her to deal relatively more comfortably with her internal
challenges, but has made her participation, together with
other similarly placed countries, indispensable in dealing
with issues with global impact.
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 On the other hand, this transition, which is affecting India
internally, economically, socially and politically, is taking
place when the world itself is in a state of transition, when
shifts of power, economic, political and military are taking
place creating uncertainty and in some cases,
apprehension, particularly in those countries that, since
the end of World War II, have laid down the agendas
and rules and controlled the institutions by which almost
all areas of global interaction were governed. To quote
an American scholar, “We are witnessing …the shift of
economic activity from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.
This transfer of economic power will trigger a shift of
political power as well, and the prospect losing their
leadership is alarming old elites.” Though the concern is
mainly about the rise of China, the following assessment
could cover India (and Brazil and South Africa) as well.
“The governance mechanisms of this new order have yet
to be established, but it is abundantly clear that old
institutions must be renewed, renovated or abandoned,
with new ones to take their place. That process is already
underway : think of the calls for reform of the United
Nations Security Council, the reapportioning of voting
rights in the IMF and World Bank, the decline of the G-7
and the emergence of the G-20…This alone is anxiety
inducing.” This alarm and anxiety and the need to reform
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and renovate the old order, is one of the more subtle
challenges that face India globally today. I shall revert to
this later.
A much more direct challenge to India is instability in
her immediate neighbourhood, characterized as it is
mainly by nascent democracies with each of which India
shares not only common borders, but common
ethnicities. China is a special case and needs to be treated
as such, as she poses probably one of the most complex
challenges to a growing India, and has been steadily
building closer relations with each of India’s neighbours.
In need of a stable and peaceful environment in
which she can concentrate her energies on her own
not inconsiderable problems, instability in the
neighbourhood becomes a serious obstacle to India’s
achievement of her objectives. However, it needs to be
noted that India has been able to establish equable
relations with Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka;
what is needed now is sustained and deeper
engagement so that these countries too can not only
become shareholders in the benefits of India’s economic
growth, but with which stronger political and strategic
relations need to be built and fostered.
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The more intractable problems lie with Nepal and of
course, Pakistan. The current chaos in Nepal, a country
which shares both borders and rivers with some of our
most vulnerable states should be a matter of concern. In
our efforts to deal with the political churning in Nepal,
we seem to have lost much of the support of the people,
if press reports are to be believed. For instance, it has
been reported that most Nepalese rooted for the side
against which India was playing cricket in the recent
World Cup Championships. In a country where there are
few sturdy institutions, India seems to be making way
for closer Chinese interaction with the only one that
appears stable, the army. The absence of a coherent policy
towards a country as strategically located as Nepal, and
where India has, in the past been able to exert some
influence, is a failure for which India will have to pay
dearly, unless urgent attention is paid to the demands of
our vital interests there.
Pakistan receives, and has always received, more
attention from our policy makers than perhaps all the
other neighbours put together, perhaps because the active
hostility towards India from that country appears to be
the bedrock of its foreign policy. There are no ready
solutions to this challenge of cross-border terrorism under
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a nuclear overhang, nor to the turbulence that currently
engulfs that country. The best that India can do at the
moment is to seek to ‘contain’ the more egregious of its
manifestations, with the support of the international
community, a balance that is in itself an extremely difficult
task calling for flexible and imaginative responses, while
giving space for Pakistan to work out its self-made
problems; whether Pakistan can be thus ‘boxed in’ will
depend on its economic vulnerability and its military
dependence on external powers. There would be some
risk taking involved, but at some point the Pakistani
nuclear bluff will have to be called. The main problem
remains in Pakistan’s search for political, diplomatic and
military parity with India, an almost impossible task, with
dire consequences not only for that country but for the
region as a whole, and in search of this parity, she has
sought alliances with major powers like the US and China,
and in an effort to gain validity for its state of nationhood,
with Saudi Arabia. The recent reports of Pakistani military
personnel, retired and on active duty being recruited to
assist the Bahraini forces, with those of Saudi Arabia, may,
while justifying to itself and to the world its importance
as a non-South Asian Muslim regional power, in fact have
a disastrous effect on the sectarian crisis now claiming
lives in Pakistan. While this makes any approach to
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Pakistan more complicated, in a sense, but it also opens
up opportunities for external persuasion as well.
The Pakistan problem is, of course, compounded by its
use by China as a check on India’s aspirations, on its
economic growth and its rising stature in the world,
notwithstanding the cooperation that is often seen
between both countries that is between India and China,
in multilateral forums. As K. Subrahmanyam had pointed
out in one of his articles, Pakistan has today developed
the same kind of relationship with China as has North
Korea, and it is in China that a possible solution may lie.
China’s own vulnerabilities in Xinjiang and the growing
Pakistan-centred demand for an Islamic caliphate in the
region, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s seeming
inability to control the forces it has let loose and its desire
to play a regional role in emulation of India, may contain
elements of a strategy that could assist the international
community in the ‘containment’ process. However, the
opacity of China’s actions and motivations remain a major
obstacle.
The rise of China is perhaps the core cause of much of
the change in power equations that has filled the West
with anxiety and admiration, and its neighbours with
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discomfort, as it begins to flex its muscles. The challenge
of a rising China is one of the most difficult ones that
face India, today and in the foreseeable future. As already
noted, the opacity of Chinese decisions give rise to this
discomfort, when its conciliatory words often appear
contradicted by its actions. Yet it is a large prosperous and
ambitious country on our borders, with which economic
and commercial relations are growing; this should have
brought stability to the relations in which background
issues relating to the border could have been negotiated.
There are, however, two factors which make this difficult-
in addition to the opacity already referred to; its
overwhelming desire for parity with the United States and
its concentration on its own interests without regard to
international rules or the interests of other countries. This
makes for a volatile mix, particularly as China itself is
facing a period of transition. It is not at all clear whether
China will follow the logical route of her development by
further liberalizing politically, in which case the outcomes
are unpredictable, or the PLA regains its influence to push
for hard-line stances within the Party, and the fears of
China’s neighbours may become well-founded.
It should not be forgotten that China’s distrust of India
initially arose with the asylum given by India to the Dalai
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Lama; its sensitivity regarding its sovereignty over Tibet
has been described as one of its ‘core’ interests, just after
Taiwan. In addition, today, China appears to view India’s
apparent growing closeness with the US, and with other
democracies in the region as an effort to contain it-
therefore the constant complaints of ‘Cold War’ attitudes
on the part of the US. There is no doubt that China would
like to be accepted as the hegemon in Asia, at least as a
first step, and India might stand in the way, if Western
predictions of India’s potential to ‘balance’ China,
materialize. In the initial years of the last decade, an
attempt was made by China to make India ‘choose’
between partnership with her or with the US, and there
was a degree of wooing. India, however, went ahead with
the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, and the Chinese
must have watched in disbelief as the US, the leading
and most vociferous proponent of non-proliferation and
the instigator of sanctions against India from 1974, not
only changed its domestic laws but expended
considerable political capital to ‘exceptionalize’ India
from the barriers to global civil nuclear trade in the
Nuclear Suppliers Group. China’s decision to respond to
this by reviving its nuclear commerce with Pakistan is
an indication of the suspicion with which it has viewed
the growing Indo-US co-operation, particularly in the
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defence sector. Yet, US-China relations are possibly closer
than US-India relations, joined as both these countries
are at the hip, economically and commercially. India has
so far made no choices; on the other hand, she has
cooperated with China, specifically in the area of climate
change, through the forum of BASIC, through BRIC and
even RIC on other economic issues and even in the G-20.
China’s unpredictability is reserved for bilateral relations,
whether relating to unexplained belligerent acts on the
border and the military development of Tibet or looking
for parity with the US in the Indian Ocean, if not eventual
dominance as the US proceeds to cut costs by reducing
the size of its Navy. The conflict of interests is, therefore,
not mainly between China and India so much as between
China and the US, which is determined to remain the
dominant, if not the sole, super power in the world,
including in Asia. India will, at some point, have to make
difficult choices.
It is here that India will have to show both flexibility and
agility in her relations with both countries, even as she
builds up her capabilities both internally and externally.
At the moment, India is seen by those who wish to be
polite, as restrained and cautious, by others as timid and
unwilling to use such power as she has developed to ‘take
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a stand’. There is, of course, no reason why she should
take any stand, provided her own specific interests are
protected. Like China, India’s positions in multilateral
forums may not be reflected in her bilateral relations, and
vice versa. I shall revert to this somewhat later.
While the challenges to India from Pakistan and China
and the Sino-Pak nexus are by and large negative, her
growing relationship with the US is a challenge of an
entirely different kind. India does not seem to, and should
not, accept the common view that the US is in decline
as a power, today. The US still remains the most
technologically, economically advanced and militarily
powerful country in the world. Its influence may have
been affected in parts of the world following the economic
crisis, but it is still the country whose support is essential
in the resolution of global challenges. After decades of
adversarial relations, today, a degree of normalization is
taking place, with less hostility on both sides. There is an
effort to identify areas of convergence where they occur
without permitting disagreements to halt progress in
cooperation in other areas. For both countries the
experience is in unchartered territory; India had got
unused to dealing with a democratic super power in any
but adversarial terms; the US has allies and countries
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which depended on it for their security and for aid.
Dealing with a large democratic developing yet emerging
country with which it has friendly relations but which
tends to chart its own course, would take some getting
used to. Both being democracies, there are limits to which
one can push the other in the pursuit of their own
interests. Precisely for this reason, there would appear
to be more in common between India and the US in terms
of strategic objectives.
However, it is not as though it is India who would have
to bring her policies and approaches in line with her much
more powerful partner on every occasion, but that she,
India, will have to expend much more effort to persuade
the US to accept the logic of India’s approaches, for
example, on issues where India’s knowledge and
experience is perhaps greater than that of the US, such as
in Iran and Afghanistan. India’s vote in the UN Security
Council on the use of force in Libya could be seen as the
beginning of such an effort, though it is not at all clear
that she tried to ‘persuade’ the US , who was under severe
pressure from her allies, the UK and France, to her point
of view. It is always wiser, of course, to choose the
occasions when a new approach is to be tried, and this
was perhaps not one of them. While the opportunities
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for cooperation with the US on strategic matters may be
patchy at the moment, it is a work in progress. The fact
that culturally India and the US do not share the same
strategic instincts would ensure that the strategic
partnership would not become an alliance, but would
remain a friendly partnership. In my view, India will have
to defend her strategic  interests on her own; a country
her size cannot and need not solely depend on outside
powers to protect her in interests, though she may have
to, given the current limitations of her power, work in
coalitions of like-minded countries, including , on
occasion, with the US.
India’s emergence has opened up for her possibilities of
closer and more substantive political, economic and even
military relationships with other countries-South Africa,
Brazil, Russia, Indonesia and ASEAN as a whole, Japan,
Australia, Israel and Africa and with the EU and its major
member countries. It is noteworthy that the recognition
of India’s changed profile internationally seems to have
shifted her foreign policy priorities from interactions with
groups- the G77, G-15 and NAM- to individual countries
with interests and problems not dissimilar to her own,
even while her interest in ensuring access to much needed
resources, such as energy sources, petroleum or uranium,
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markets for her products and her search for high
technology including in the defence sector,  would seem
to determine where her strategic interests lie today. Her
interests in the troubled Gulf States have been fairly
clearly enunciated-as sources of energy and as hosts to
large numbers of Indian nationals whose remittances
home are vital for the local economies of their home states.
Such clear enunciations have been and continue to be rare,
though it is clear that the articulation of interests leads
other countries to accept and respect the actions of India-
the visit to the subcontinent, including to India, of the
Foreign Minister of Bahrain, and the visit of the Saudi
National Security Advisor in the last few weeks should
indicate a recognition of India’s legitimate interests in the
stability of the region.
(Almost equal in importance to India’s security as oil, is
the access to high technology both for our economic
development as well as our strategic interests. As a
country poor in natural resources, it is inevitable that
India would have to rely on her human resources and to
build a knowledge economy to achieve her overall
development objectives and to enable India to compete
in a world where her footprint, so far, has been very light.
This was clearly in the Prime Minister’s mind when he
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placed such a high priority on the Indo-US Civil nuclear
deal, and the breaking of barriers to access by our
scientists, engineers and industry to the best technology
available globally, which had been denied India for
decades. This might require the careful cultivation of
partnerships globally including through the Indian
diaspora.)
As I said at the outset of my presentation, the most subtle
challenge that faces India is at the multilateral level.  India
has benefitted from the current system of global
governance, though the system has kept real power in
the hands of countries which had built it more than sixty
years ago. With the incredible rise of China as an
economic power at a time when the Western world was
facing one of its most severe economic crises, its growing
military strength and its more recent ‘assertiveness’ has
caused concern, as pointed out before, in the old
established countries, as power was seen to be shifting
away from them. In this scenario, the emergence of other
large developing countries, including India, with
respectable rates of economic growth, and, at the
multilateral levels, with similar approaches as China
towards the building a new international order, has
caused the commentators of the West to conflate the ideas
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of China and India, as though the experiences,
achievements and objectives of both these countries were
also similar. While China has not been shy of spelling
out its ‘core’ interests and flexing its muscles, on occasion
all but ignoring international rules, India’s approach has
always been incremental; change was supported, but not
through radical reform. From the restructuring of the UN
Security Council, to the de facto inclusion of India in the
core group of negotiating countries in the WTO, to
demands for reforms in the IMF and World Bank and to
the weight of these emerging economies in the G-20 which
has become in reality a successor to the G-7/8 group of
most economically advanced countries, the outlines of
the new order seem apparent.
However, it does not seem that India has identified what
she wants changed in which regime, nor has she indicated
that she has a comprehensive view of what architecture
would best suit her needs and interests. In the past, she
has been seen as a ‘naysayer’, whether in the context of
the non-proliferation regime or the WTO, and she has
tended to avoid being bound by international rules that
she was unable to change through negotiations. This was
most evident in the negotiations relating both to the NPT
and the CTBT. Unfortunately, we tend to deal with these
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different regimes in silos, as it were; with different
ministries dealing with separate subjects and the political
advantages that could accrue to India by having a
more interlinked approach is frequently lost. Global
governance is not an area where any expertise exists
today in the country; yet the positions we take on issues
of non-proliferation, climate change, in the Doha round,
on labour standards, on human rights and humanitarian
law, on the global commons such as outer space and the
oceans, where rules are still evolving and may impact on
India’s interests, need to be within an overall strategic
framework, with a clear view of  the shapes these regimes
must take if our overall interests are to be protected.
Today, India has some power to get her interests
taken into account. Earlier, as a Western commentator
on India’s nuclear programme has said with regard to
India’s role in the NPT negotiations, at that time, India
may have had logic and a UN mandate to back the
position she took in the negotiations, she did not
have power on her side. Today, India is experiencing,
perhaps for the first time since her independence, an
unaccustomed, though fledgling, ability to influence the
international discourse on issues which she perceives to
be in her interest.
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I would like to conclude what I am afraid has become a
rather lengthy presentation, by raising some questions
regarding India’s will to power to which there are today
no clear answers. Recently, at a talk in Delhi, a noted
French political commentator, after describing the
potential of India’s newly acquired power on the global
stage, raised the question with his Indian audience,
whether India had the will to power. There was no reply
to the query. Of course, India has to have such power-to
influence, cajole and persuade, if not to subtly coerce- if
she identifies that her core interests are at stake.
With that power, fledgling though it might be, her
objectives need to be articulated and she must be
ready to exercise that power. At one level, India has; in
a variety of forums she has declared that her security
interests cover the area from the Straits of Hormuz to the
Straits of Malacca, and her recent efforts to strengthen
her naval power, with particular relevance to the Indian
Ocean, indicate at least a change of style, if not of actual
policy. There appears to be a greater confidence in some
public articulation of India’s strategic interests; however,
these are rare occasions, possibly awaiting the growth
of a greater degree of assurance in her international
relations.
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I would therefore interpret the word ‘emerging’ as
relating not only to India’s economy, but to her fledgling
power in global affairs, fledgling because she may yet
not fulfill people’s expectations and her potential may
remain stifled. There are many major challenges India
faces, both internally, regionally and globally, even one
of which might derail or at least, stall, her onward
trajectory. Yet, I have argued, in these challenges lie
opportunities for India, if she will seek them out, to
achieve the objectives she has set for herself, for a life of
dignity and security for her people in an environment of
global stability and prosperity.
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